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1. INTRODUCTION
Reasoning and talking about time is to a great extent reasoning and talking about
what actually happens or might happen at some time or another. This is perhaps not
crucial if our concern is with abstract temporal reasoners or planners intended for
specific applications, but it arguably matters for the prospects of knowledge repre-
sentation and natural language semantics. The variety of the world is the variety of
the things that happen, and we can’t deal with it without taking events at face value
(just as we cannot deal with physical bodies or masses by confining ourselves to
their spatial coordinates). This is the stance we took in [11], where we argued that
the notion of an event structure can be given an autonomous characterization ger-
mane to both common sense and natural language. In [12] and [13] we also showed
that the formal connection between the way events are perceived to be ordered and
the underlying temporal dimension is essentially that of a construction of a linear or-
dering from the basic formal ontological properties of a domain of events—
specifically, mereological and topological properties. The purpose of this paper is to
expand on this by further investigating the subtle connections betw en me and
events. After a brief review, in the first part we shall generalize the notion of an
event structure to that of a refinement structure, where various degrees of temporal
granularity are accommodated. In the second part we shall then investigate how
these structures can account for the context-dependence of temporal structures in
natural language semantics.
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2. REFINING EVENT STRUCTURES
2.1 PRELIMINARIES. The basic notion of an event structure is presented in detail in
[13]. The underlying mereotopological machinery is developed within a first-order
language with identity and descriptions. To allow for the possibility of improper de-
scriptive terms, we use a free logic supplemented with Lambert’s axiom [8]:
(1) " y(y=ixf x «  (f y Ù  " x(f x fi  x=y)).
(This is not crucial; alternative logical systems—e.g., based on Russell’s theory of
descriptions—may also be adequate for most purposes.)
The primitive mereological and topological relations are “part of” and
“boundary of”, symbolized by ‘P’ and ‘B’ respectively [17]. Additional derived no-
tions can be defined as usual:
(2) x=y =df P(x, y) Ù  P(y, x) identity
(3) O (x, y) =df $z (P(z, x) Ù  P(z, y)) overlap
(4) X(x, y) =df O (x, y) Ù  Ø P(x, y) crossing
(5) PP(x, y) =df P(x, y) Ù  Ø P(y, x) proper part
(6) BP(x, y) =df P(x, y) Ù  B(x, y) boundary part
(7) sxf x =df ix" y (O (y, x) «  $z (f z Ù  O (z, y))) sum
(8) pxf x =df sx " z (f z fi  P(x, z)) product
(9) x+y =df sz (P(z, x) Ú  P(z, y)) join
(10) x· y =df sz (P(z, x) Ù  P(z, y)) meet
(11) x~y =df sz (P(z, x) Ù  Ø O (z, y)) difference
(12) ~x =df sz (Ø O (z, x)) complement
(13) c(x) =df x + sz (B(z, x)) closure
(14) C(x, y) =df O (c(x), y) Ú  O (c(y), x) connection
(15) Cn(x) =df " y" z (x=y+z fi  C(y, z)) self-connectedness
As specific axioms we assume at least those of classical extensional mereology
(see Simons [15] for an overview) supplemented with the analogues of the basic
topological axioms for closure systems (Smith [16]):
(16) P(x, y) «  " z (O (z, x) fi  O (z, y))
(17) $xf x fi  $x (x = sxf x)
(18) c(c(x)) = c(x)
(19) c(x+y) = c(x) + c(y).
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This yields a minimal theory which proves fit for some basic patterns of mereotopo-
logical reasoning. Further principles (concerning, e.g., the dependent ature of
boundaries) can be added as required.
2.2 EVENT STRUCTURES. An event structure is an ordered pair á E, dñ , where E is a
mereotopologically self-connected domain:
(20) " z(O(z, x) Ú O(z, y)) ®  C(x, y)
and d  picks out a maximal class of “divisors” closed under the basic operations of
join, meet, and difference (within specific limits):
(21) d (x) ®  Ø Cn(~x)
(22) d (x) Ù  d (y) ®  (d (x+y) «  C(x,y))
(23) d (x) Ù  d (y) ®  (d (x ´ y) «  O(x,y))
(24) d (x) Ù  d (y) ®  (d (x–y) «  X(x,y)).
Intuitively, the d s are somewhat distinguished items that separate their complement
into two disconnected parts. Taking E as a set of events, the idea is to think of these
divisors as comprising all that happens during certain “periods”, counting the events
on one side as past events, and those on the other side as future events. (The closure
conditions (22)–(24) are easily motivated: if every (bounded) event must be included
in some divisor, then any two connected divisors must make up a (thicker) divisor,
and if divisors are to divide the entire domain into two parts, past and future, then
they must not themselves consist of disconnected divisors. Moreover, divisors must
have a uniform orientation, hence the common part of any two overlapping divisors
and the difference between any two crossing divisors must themselves be divisors.)
We regard these as minimal conditions. Further constraints on E and/or d  ca
of course be added to select specific structures.
2.3 ORIENTED STRUCTURES. Event structures can be used to provide a characteri-
zation of the intuitive notion of an event (or a family of events) separating past from
future events. This is because the divisors of any given structure form a closure sys-
tem in which every (bounded) event can be associated with the smallest divisor con-
taining it:
(25) d(x) =df p z(d (z) Ù  P(x, z)).
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Event structures say nothing, however, as to whether a given event actually lies in
the past or in the future of another event (divisor). That is, event structures are not
temporally oriented.
Oriented structures can be obtained as follows. Define:
(26) d*(x) =df x + s z$ y(P(y, x) Ù  z=d(y))
(27) F(z1,x,z2) =df Ø O(z1+z2,d(x)) Ù  Ø C(d*(z1),d*(z2))
(28) S(z1,x,z2) =df F(z1,x,z2) Ù  z1+z2=~d(x).
(Intuitively, d*extends d to unbounded events; F is a relation of two events, z1 and
z2 , flanking (i.e., lying on two opposite sides of) a third one, x; and S is the relation
of one event, x, separating its complement into two parts, z1 and z2.) Then a triple
á E, d, eñ  is an oriented event structure iff á E, dñ  is an event structure and e is a dis-
tinguished element of E such that
(29) $ x$ y(S(e,x,y)).
That is, an oriented structure is obtained by singling out an “anchor” element e rela-
tive to which every other event can be positioned on the assumption that e covers
one of the two sides (intuitively, either the past or the future) of some event x. The
positioning is obtained via the following:
(30) ƒ(x) =df i z$ y(S(z,x,y) Ù  (O(x,e)® P(z,e)) Ù  (Ø O(x,e)® P(e,z)))
(31) ƒ'(x) =df s z (P(x, ƒ(z))).
This effectively amounts to defining ƒ and ƒ' as a pair of Galois connections so that
(32) S(ƒ(x),x,ƒ'(x))
(32') S(ƒ'(x),x,ƒ(x))
always hold. We then just stipulate that e r presents the past. That is, we treat ƒ as a
function of temporal orientation associating each event in the domain with the totality
of events that precede it; and correspondingly, we treat ƒ' as a function associating
each event with the events that follow it. This is a conventional choice (the alterna-
tive stipulation would do as well), but we can show that it is coherent throughout.
For instance, the following are all consequences of (29) (given (21)–(24)):
(33) ƒ(x) = ƒ(d(x))
(33') ƒ'(x) = ƒ'(d(x))
(34) P(x, y) ®  P(ƒ(y), ƒ(x))
(34') P(x, y) ®  P(ƒ'(y), ƒ'(x))
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(35) P(x, ƒ(y)) ®  P(y, ƒ'(x))
(35') P(x, ƒ'(y)) ®  P(y, ƒ(x))
(36) P(x, ƒ(y)) ®  P(ƒ(x), ƒ(y)))
(36') P(x, ƒ'(y)) ®  P(ƒ'(x), ƒ'(y))).
In fact, it can be shown that if á E, d, eñ  is an oriented event structure with ori-
entation functions ƒ and ƒ', the temporal dimension can be fully retrieved. For in-
stance, define temporal precedence and overlap:
(37) TP(x, y) =df P(x, ƒ(y)))
(38) TO(x, y) =df O(d*(x), d*(y)).
Then we can prove the mereological counterparts of Kamp’s [6] axioms for strict
linear orders (see Pianesi and Varzi [13] for details):
(39) TO(x, x)
(40) TO(x, y) ®  TO(y, x)
(41) TP(x, y) ®  Ø TO(x, y)
(42) TP(x, y) ®  Ø TP(y, x)
(43) TP(x, y) Ù  TP(y, z) ®  TP(x, z)
(44) TP(x, y) Ù TO(y, z) Ù TP(z, t) ® TP(x, t)
(45) TP(x, y) Ú TP(y, x) Ú TO(x, y).
2.4 REFINEMENT STRUCTURES. The kind of temporal structure that emerges from
oriented event structures strictly depends on the choice of the relevant divisor condi-
tion d . Thus, for instance, dense orders can be derived by imposing suitable condi-
tions on d , much as is the case of discrete orders. We now consider more complex
structures involving not just one dividing condition d , but e tire collections of such
conditions. This will provide a suitable framework to account for shifting in tempo-
ral perspective.
A refinement event structure is a triple á E, {d i : iÎ I}, eñ  such that (i) for each
iÎ I, á E, d i , eñ  is an oriented event structure, and (ii) the family of divisors {d i : iÎ I}
is closed under meet, i.e., for all x,yÎ E and all i,jÎ I there exists some kÎ I satisfy-
ing the following:
(46) d i (x) Ù  d j (y) ®  d k (x ´ y).
(This has the ffect of securing coherence among the various constituent event
structures. Equivalently, we could define a refinement structure as a class {Si : iÎ I}
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of oriented event structures Si = á E, d i , eñ  closed under meet.) Note that we implicitly
require that every oriented structure involved in a refinement have the same anchor
e. This has a natural motivation, considering that oriented structures whose anchor
elements are related by a parthood relation induce the same ordering. That is, if á E,
d, e1 ñ  and á E, d, e2 ñ  are two oriented event structures, and ƒ1 , ƒ1', ƒ2, and ƒ2' their
respective orientation functions, we have:
(47) P(e1, e2) Ú  P(e2, e1) ®  ƒ1 =ƒ2 Ù  ƒ1'=ƒ2' .
Thus there are only two ways of orienting an event structure á E, dñ , and these can be
obtained by picking out any pair of oriented structures whose anchor elements do
not overlap. It is then easy to verify that such structures would reverse the order,
i.e.,
(48) ƒ1 =ƒ2' Ù ƒ1'=ƒ2.
On the other hand, it is clear from (47) that the above-mentioned implicit condition
could be weakened to the requirement that oriented event structures may enter into a
refinement provided that of any two of them, the anchor of one is part of the anchor
of the other. That is, we could consider structures á E, {d i : iÎ I}, {ei : iÎ I}ñ  with the
property that, for all jÎ I,
(49) P(ei , ej ) Ú P(ej , ei ).
However, since this generality yields no significant gain, in the following we shall
confine ourselves to refinements in which the anchor element is kept fixed.
If á E, {d i : iÎ I}, eñ  is such a refinement structure, we can then define a refine-
ment relation |>_  among its constitutive divisors as follows:
(50) d i |>_   d j  =df  " x (d i (x) ®  $ y (d j(y) Ù  P(y,x))).
Thus, intuitively, d j is a refinement of d i iff the former draws at least the same tem-
poral distinctions as the latter (perhaps more). It is immediately verified that this re-
lation is reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. Furthermore, |>_  is monotonic with
respect to the ordering conditions ƒi , ƒi' (induced in the obvious way):
(51) d i |>_   d j ®  " x" y (P(x, ƒi (y)) ®  P(x, ƒj (y))
(52) d i |>_   d j ®  " x" y (P(x, ƒi'(y)) ®  P(x, ƒj'(y)).
This means that |>_  behaves as a homomorphism with respect to ƒ and ƒ' and, ulti-
mately, with respect to the ordering relations. (Note that this depends crucially on
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the above requirement on anchors). Thus, whenever an event x precedes another
event y in a given oriented structure, the same obtains in every event structure
whose divisor condition is a refinement of the given one:
(53) TPi (x, y) Ù  d i |>_   d j ®  TPj (x, y)
(where TPi and TPj are the relations of temporal precedence induced by d i  and d j ,
respectively).
3. REFINING TEMPORAL REFERENCE
3.1 DENSITY. Refinement structures seem particularly suited to account for the ef-
fect of context on the choice of temporal structures. Landman [9] observes that if
language exhibits the possibility of indefinitely refining temporal relations among
events—as seems to be the case with natural language—the underlying model of
time must be dense. Thus, for instance, we can imagine a process of gradual refine-
ment:
(54) John and Mary met last year. More exactly, they met during summer
vacation. To be precise, it was the 15th of August. If fact, they met
while having brunch. John was just having his first sip of coffee ...
Even if there is a point beyond which refinement is no more practically feasible, it
seems that this is not enough to posit discreteness as linguistically relevant.
In the present framework, density can be obtained by adding the mereotopolog-
ical counterpart of the usual axiom for dense linear orders on closed (or, equiva-
lently, open) intervals:
(55) TP(c(x),c(y)) ®  $ z (TP(c(x), c(z)) Ù  TP(c(z), c(y))).
More generally, in the context of a refinement structure á E, {d i : iÎ I}, eñ  this corre-
sponds to assuming the following to hold for relevant iÎ I:
(56) P(c(x), ƒi (c(y))) ®  $ z (P(c(x), ƒi (c(z))) Ù  P(c(z), ƒi (c(y)))).
However this does not fully capture the idea behind (54). The interesting question is
what kind of divisors are presupposed by the underlying unlimited refining process.
Clearly they must be infinite in number (which in turn presupposes that the domain
E must have infinite cardinality). But, more importantly, they cannot include a
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minimal element (with respect to the ordering |>_ ). Th s amounts to the following re-
quirement:
(57) For every iÎ I there exists jÎ I such that d i |>_   d j but not d j |>_   d i .
This entails that divisors must themselves be infinitely divisible, i.e., in the termi-
nology to be developed in the next section, there can be no absolute punctual events.
From a cognitive perspective, the kind of event domain required by (55)–(57)
may seem somewhat too rich: does our common sense notion of an event support
the idea of a really dense course of events? (The issue does not arise within merely
temporal models, since we are more confident with the idea that the time line is
infinite, without end points, and dense.) It seems that natural language gives us the
possibility of refining temporal relations without any limitation. But capturing the
properties of natural language and describing the common-sense world are two dis-
tinct matters and should be kept apart. If so, this would be an argument in favour of
the view that natural language is an autonomous cognitive system—i.e., in the case
at hand, that the interpretive properties of natural language cannot be derived directly
from the structure of the common-sense world. A different perspective would be to
assimilate the discrepancy between language and cognitive ontology to the difference
between properties-in-intension and properties-in-extension, as Habel [3] seems to
suggest. Thus, the possibility of indefinitely refining temporal relations would not
(contra Landman [9]) require an underlying infinite, dense ontology; rather, it would
be a property of language as a process. Representations can be broken up and made
finer.
We shall leave the issue open. But we shall observe that the two theses could
be reconciled if the density-in-intension property is precisely what marks a differ-
ence (among others) between language and the other cognitive systems.
3.2 PUNCTUALITY . Just as natural language appears to allow us to indefinitely refine
temporal relations as illustrated in (54), it also permits us to discretize time at will:
(58) That’s how they met: At a certain point, John asked the waiter to invite
her at his table; the next moment she was sitting in front of him.
This is another fundamental manifestation of the inherent context-dependency of
time granularity: what counts as a moment in one context may be structurally anal-
ysed in another, and vice versa. Plain event structures do not allow one to account
for this variability. For although they capture the intuition that the segmentation of
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time is not absolute (it depends on the divisor condition d ), they supply no means
for making this explicit (within every oriented structure, the divisor condition d  is
fixed). Refinement structures provide a natural way to overcome this limitation: the
variety of possible choices is reflected in the variety of available d s.
Intuitively, punctual events are instantaneous, i.e., do not extend over any time
interval: they are located in time but do not take up time. These include for instance
boundary events traditionally classified as “culminations” or “achievements”. Within
the present setting, this does not amount to a requirement of mereological atomicity:
what counts as instantaneous, as opposed to extended in time, depends entirely on
the relevant d . For divisors not only provide the basis for temporal orientation but,
in a sense, also for temporal measurement. Punctuality is a relative notion.
This is not to deny that punctuality rests on some sort of minimality: punctual
events cannot accommodate more structured ones. However, contrary to a rather
standard practice, we need not in this regard consider the distinction between ins-
tants and intervals—or more generally any distinction based on such absolute no-
tions as size or duration—as the relevant parameters. We also need not impose any
specific axioms for characterizing punctuality. Rather, the distinguishing properties
of punctual events and instant algebras can be derived from more basic aspects of
event structures.
To see this, define the notion of a minimal divisor relative to an oriented event
structure á E,  d , eñ :
(59) Md (x) =df d (x) Ù  " y(P(y, x) ®  Ød( y)).
Thus, a divisor x is minimal iff it does not contain other divisors (relative to the
same d ). As a consequence, every event that is part of such an x ha  x as its divisor:
(60) Md (x) Ù  P(y, x) ®  d(y)=x.
This is a welcome consequence, since (60) entails that “temporal” differences are
neglected inside a minimal divisor. In fact, we can show that any events that are
parts of such a divisor are simultaneous, i.e., are temporally overlapped by the same
events:
(61) Md (x) Ù  P(y, x) ®  " z (TO(z, x) « TO(z, y)).
More generally, we have:
(62) Md (x) Ù  TO(y, x) Ù  TO(z, x) ®  TO(y, z)
(63) Md (x) Ù  P(w, x) Ù TO(y, w) Ù  TO(z, w) ®  TO(y, z).
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Thus, if two events temporally overlap a minimal divisor (or a part thereof), then
they temporally overlap each other. Vice versa, we have that divisors that can only
be temporally overlapped by temporally overlapping events are minimal:
(64) d (x) Ù  " y" z(TO(y, x) Ù  TO(z, x) ®  TO(y, z)) ®  Md (x).
Putting (62) and (64) together, the fundamental properties characterizing punc-
tual events according to Kamp [6] can be shown to hold of minimal—and only
minimal—divisors. We can then propose the following definition for punctual
events:
(65) PE(x) =df Md (d(x)).
Thus, punctual events are not merely—and not necessarily—atomic events, i.e.,
events with no proper parts (although of course every atomic event is punctual, re-
gardless of d ). Rather, they are events whose internal structure is irrelevant for the
purpose of temporal distinctions.
Punctuality is thus relativized to the particular event structure at hand—hence,
ultimately, to the particular divisor condition d . By changing d , events previously
treated as punctual may become non-punctual, in that their internal temporal struc-
ture is made available, and vice versa. This notion of “change”, as we said, is purely
metalinguistic if we focus on plain structures. However, refinement structures are
endowed with families of divisor conditions and may therefore accommodate this
variability directly, by drawing connections between the available d s. (There is a
clear modal flavor to this, which is reminiscent of the way Kripke structures can be
used to account for intensional notions such as necessity and possibility.) This can
be made more precise as follows.
3.3 PUTTING EVERYTHING INTO SEMANTICS. First of all, here is how some key
semantic notions can be recovered within the basic framework. Let E = á E, d, eñ  be
an ordered event structure. For every K  Í  E we can introduce the following re-
stricted relations:
(66) |
__ E, K = {á x,yñÎ K  ´  K: P(x,y)}
(67) <E, K = {á x,yñÎ K  ´  K: TP(x,y)}
(68) oE, K = {á x,yñÎ K  ´  K: TO(x,y)}.
Now we can define a temporal structure induced by E to be any tuple TE = á K, |
__ E, K  ,
<E, K  , oE, K  ñ  with K Í  E. In particular, TE  qualifies as the p riod structure induced
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by E if K  = {xÎ E: d (x)}, and it qualifies as the instant structure if K  = {xÎ E:
Md (x)}. Since <E, K behaves as a relation of temporal precedence in view of (39)–
(45), these two notions correspond to the standard notions of period and instant
structures (divisors and minimal divisors acting as counterparts of intervals and in-
stants, respectively). Standard temporal (instant or interval) semantics for a tensed
language L can then be obtained by defining a modelfor L to be any structure M =
á TE , h ñ  where TE = á K, |
__ E, K  , <E, K  , oE, K  ñ  is a temporal structure induced by some
oriented event structure E = á E, d, eñ  and h is an interpretation function determining
a truth-value assignment for every atomic sentence/formula of L relative t  arbitrary
elements of K.
To illustrate, if L is some language supplied with the tense operators ‘P’ (“it
has been the case that”) and ‘F’ (“it will be the case that”), we obtain a classical Pri-
orean semantics [14] for L by requiring the satisfaction relation |=  o meet the fol-
lowing conditions for all instant models M and all relevant “instants” t  (we write ‘>’
for the inverse of ‘<’, omitting subscripts):
(69) M |= t Pj  iff M |= t' j  for some t'< t
(70) M |= t F j  iff M |= t' j  for some t'> t .
(The variety of resulting logics would depend on the properties of <, hence ulti-
mately on the specific mereotopology of E and d .) The semantics of other tense op-
erators can then be defined as usual. For instance, the following define Kamp’s [5]
operators ‘S’ (“since”) and ‘U’ (“until”):
(71) M |= t Sjy  iff M |= t' j  and M |= t" y  for some t'<t and every t">t' such
that >t"
(72) M |= t U jy  iff M |= t' j  and M |= t" y  for some t'>t and every t"<t' such
that <t".
Likewise, we obtain a classical interval semantics as in Humberstone [4] y referring
to interval models instead. The condition for ‘P’, ‘F’, etc. remain the same, and we
can in addition specify the semantics for the downward and upward “holds” oper-
ators ‘Hd’ and ‘Hu’ (again, we write ‘|
__ ’ for the inverse of ‘|__ ’, omitting sub-
scripts):
(73) M |= t Hdj  iff M |= t' j  for every t'|__ t
(74) M |= t Huj  iff M |= t' j  for every t' |__ t .
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As a further example, Dowty’s [2] operator ‘B’ (“becomes to be the case”) can be
characterized by the following condition:
(75) M |= t Bj  iff (i) M |= t1 Ø j  for some t1ot for which there exists no t'|
__  t
such that t'< t1, and (ii) M |= t2 j  for some t2ot for which there exists no
t'|
__ t such that t'> t2.
Of course we can also extend these semantics by relativizing the satisfaction
relation to all sorts of events (not just divisors), so as to read M |= x j  simply as
“sentence j  holds in model M throughout event x”. This means using temporal
structures TE = á K, |
__ E, K  , <E, K  , oE, K  ñ where K is a proper superset of the sets {xÎ E:
d (x)} and {xÎ E: Md (x)}. This may be useful, for instance, to account for a logic of
change in the spirit of Kamp [7]. Moreover, it is understood that if L  is, say, a first
oder language, then the event domain K will also serve as a domain of quantification
for event-based semantics in the spirit of Davidson [1]. For instance, on Parsons’s
tensed formulation [10], a sentence j  such as “John met Mary in the dining room”
would have the following truth conditions:
(76) M |= t j  iff there exists some x < t such that x is an event of John’s
meeting Mary and x takes place in the dining room.
(The full-blown picture would of course have to consider many-sorted models in
which the domain includes other entities as well.) These developments are obvious
and we shall not consider specific applications.
Rather, let us now consider how the picture can be fruitfully extended by con-
struing models out of refinement event structures. If R = á E, {d i : iÎ I},  eñ  is such a
structure, we can define a corresponding refinement temporal structure to be a fam-
ily TR ={TE i : iÎ I} of temporal structures TE i = á K i , |
__
  E i , Ki , <E i , Ki , oE i , Ki ñ , one for
each iÎ I. (We do not require that these be all of the same sort, for instance, that they
be all interval structures. On the contrary, as we saw above, the point of introducing
refinement is precisely to be able to switch naturally from one (kind of) temporal
structure to another.) Note that since e is fixed, the temporal orderings will be co-
herent throughout, i.e., th  following will hold for all xi , yi Î K i and all xj , yj Î K j
(i, jÎ I):
(77) TP(xi , xj ) Ù  TP(yj , yi ) ® (xj <Ej , Kj  yj ®  xi <Ei , Ki  yi ).
A refinement model wil  then be a pair M = á TR , h ñ  where h is a family of interpreta-
tion functions {hi : iÎ I} each of which determines a truth-value assignment for every
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atomic sentence/formula of the language relative to arbitrary elements of the corre-
sponding domain K i .
With respect to such structures, the customary semantic conditions for tensed
languages present no significant difficulty, and we can proceed as before. However,
the relation of satisfaction will now have to be relativized with respect to divisors as
well, i.e., with respect to arbitrary elements of arbitrary domains K i , the latter being
determined by the corresponding divisors of the underlying refinement event struc-
ture. For instance, (69)–(70) will have to be formulated along the following lines:
(78) For all iÎ I and all tÎ K i : M |= t,i Pj  iff M |= t',i j  for some t'Î K i such
that '< t
(79) For all iÎ I and all tÎ K i : M |= t,i F j  iff M |= t',i j  for some t'Î K i such
that '> t .
These conditions will not be affected by the possibility of varying the second
contextual feature (the index ). In addition, however, we can now specify the
semantics of operators which do depend on the variable granularity of the divisors.
Consider for instance the operators ‘M|___ ’, ‘N|___ ’, ‘M’, and ‘N’ defined by the
following clauses (where ‘<’ denotes the union of the relevant <Ei , Ki relations, and
‘>’ the corresponding inverse relation):
(80) For all iÎ I and all tÎ K i : M |= t,i M|___ j  iff M |= t',i' j  for some i'Î I and
some t'Î K i' such that t'|
__
  t
(81) For all iÎ I and all tÎ K i : M |= t,i N|___ j  iff M |= t',i' j  for every i'Î I and
every t'Î K i' such that t'|
__
  t
(82) For all iÎ I and all tÎ K i : M |= t,i Mj  iff M |= t',i' j  for some i'Î I and
some t'Î K i' such that d i |>_   d i' and t'|
__
  t
(83) For all iÎ I and all tÎ K i : M |= t,i N j  iff M |= t',i' j  for every i'Î I and ev-
ery t'Î K i' such that d i |>_   d i' and t'|
__
  t .
These are only a few among a large variety of possible operators that can be
distinguished (just permute or change the quantifiers ‘some’ and ‘all’ or the mereo-
temporal relations |
__  and < to get a first extra stock), but they serve the purpose of
illustration. Consider for instance the operator ‘M|___ ’ (80), and suppose for sim-
plicity that M = á TR , h ñ  is based on a family TR of instant structures. Then we can
think of this operator as specifying that the argument sentence j  is true at a certain
instant t with granularity  (i.e., true throughout an event treated as punctual under
the i-th way of drawing divisors, d i ) iff there is some way of changing temporal
REFINING TEMPORAL REFERENCE IN EVENT STRUCTURES
14
granularity (relative to the range of possibilities admitted by the underlying
refinement structure R = á E, {d i : iÎ I},  eñ ) so as to make j  true at some sub-instant
of t. What this means is that ‘M|___ ’ behaves essentially as a “precisification” operator:
if you count time in moon cycles, you might not be able to make certain relevant dis-
tinctions (you might not be able to establish the truth of (58), “John asked the waiter
to invite Mary at his table; the next moment she was sitting in front of him”); but if
you count time in minutes, then things may change. In other words, the relevant
sentence, j may be false notbecause things went differently (e.g., because Mary
refused to accept the invitation), but because the relevant temporal granularity is too
coarse for j  to be recognized as true. If you can get down to a sufficiently refined
temporal structure, this may become apparent and j  may be recognized as true.
Thus, we can think of ‘M|___ ’ as an operator allowing one to double check the
possibility for a sentence to come out true under suitable temporal refinements.
(Within certain obvious limits, this would correspond to the English “more
precisely”.) Likewise, ‘N|___ ’ is essentially a “no matter how” operator: no matter
how you change granularity (within the l mits set by the underlying refinement
structure), if j  is true, it remains true, and if it is false, you can find some sub-
instant where it is false.
The operators defined by (82) and (83) are similar, but somewhat more illus-
trative of the intensional flavor of refinement processes. In the foregoing example
we have implicitly assumed that changing granularity is a very regular process: you
may count time in moon cycles, weeks, days, or minutes; but once you choose one
grain, you apply it throughout (until you change grain). That is, if d i is your moon-
cycle divisor, it divides the whole of history into moon-cycles: it does not vary from
one “epoch” to another. This is intuitive, but there is nothing of course in our notion
of a(n instant-based) refinement model that guarantees it. And p rhaps there are
good reasons to consider models where this is not the case after all. If so, then the
operators ‘M|___ ’ and ‘N|___ ’ are not quite the appropriate counterparts of the intuitive
operations discussed above, and reference to ‘M’ and ‘N’ becomes necessary. Un-
like the former, the semantics of these latter operators makes explicit reference to the
sort of granularity to be considered in the refinement process. In other words, these
operators do not force you to consider every possible alternative granularity, but
only those alternatives that correspond to an actual refi ement of the initial d i .
The semantic mechanism operating here is reminiscent of an idea familiar from
modal logics: modal operators do not range over all possible worlds, but only over
those worlds that are “accessible” from the given one. It the analogy is acceptable,
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then the richness of the basic framework need hardly be emphasized. The variety of
interesting accessibility relations among refinements is very large indeed, and ap-
pears to be a rewarding subject for further exploration.
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